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 The amendment of 1945 Constitution is deemed to have many 
weaknesses and shortcomings, especially related to the regulate 
institutional relationship between state institutions. There are some 
problem related to the obscurity of position of state institutions, the 
overlapping of duties, functions and authority which lead to the 
unrealized of checks and balances and the vulnerable for abuse of power. 
The direction of the arrangement of relationship between state 
institutions should be: First, to strengthen the implementation and 
purification of presidential system; Second, to clear up the position of 
the MPR as a joint session between DPD and DPR in an institutional 
relationship directed to create a strong bicameralism system; Third, the 
arrangement of judicial institutions should affirm the concept of MK as 
the court of law and MA as the court of justice. With the addition of 
constitutional complaint authority for MK and the authority of the 
previlegiatum forum for MA. While the arrangement of institutional 
relationship between MA and KY in supervising the judge should be 
developed based on the concept of share responsibility; Fourth, to make 
Attorney General as a constitutional organ that have the same 
constitutional authority and legal standing as other law enforcement 
agencies, namely National Police and the Courts (MA and MK). Fifth, 
the institutionalization of independent state commissions as consti-
tutional organs based on the criteria of having the urgency and function 
of strengthening the constitutional democratic state and strengthening 
the mechanism of checks and balances. 
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1.  Introduction  
Since the stipulated of the amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia (the 1945 Constitution) in the last 19 years, there are still many weaknesses 
and deficiencies in its regulate especially about relationship between state institutions 
that have implications for the state administration. The amendment of the 1945 
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Constitution in the process of drafting has indeed received much criticism. According to 
Indrayana,1 the amendments of the 1945 Constitution do not have the key factors that 
should be available in a democratic process of Constitution-making: (i) there is no clear 
plan for determining key questions, e.g. when and how amendments will be made and 
what would it be like; (ii) the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) as institution that 
have authority to amend and stipulate the Constitution have failed to win the people's 
trust; and (iii) public participation is very lacking and not well organized. 
Despite facing a number of criticisms and theoretical problem in the amendment process 
of the 1945 Constitution, in the end the 1945 Constitution became more democratic in 
substance compared to the Constitution before. The amendment of 1945 Constitution 
presents a clearer concept of separation of powers between the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary and the protection of human rights. This was possible due to the 
euphoria of transitional period from the authoritarian New Order regime to the reform 
era leading to democracy that provided a nuance that encouraged openly debates in the 
amendment process of the 1945 Constitution in the MPR and public participation were 
allowed in the debate. Although, there are still shortcomings in the MPR's working 
procedures to attract more public involvement.2 
In addition to the lack of optimal public participation, the substantial weakness in the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution is primarily related to the concept of authority 
regulation and the design of relationship patterns between state institutions that have 
not been able to established the checks and balances that have implications for the 
implementation of the tasks, functions and authorities of state institutions that are 
ineffective and vulnerable to abuse of power. Below we can see a number of weaknesses 
related to the regulation of authority and relations between state institutions after the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution, namely: 
First, related to the weakness of checks and balances of relations between state 
institutions, for example, legislative power between the House of Representatives (DPR) 
is so superior of its authority compared to the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) 
that can be considered has very minimalist authority. From the authority of legislation, 
supervision and budget, DPR is the institution that dominates and determines all of the 
process, while the DPD only has a mere authority as a functioning institution to propose 
and discuss a Bill related to regional autonomy but it has no authority to approve the 
Bill. Likewise, regarding the authority to conduct supervision, the supervision 
conducted by the DPD is indirect and must be submitted first to the DPR, it’s also not 
binding. Based on these weaknesses of the authority of DPD, Mahfud MD called the 
existence of DPD only as an institution that is merely constitutional formality.3 With 
such institutional design, it is unlikely that there will be checks and balances of 
institutional relationships between DPR and DPD as a coequal legislative body. 
Second, besides the institutional relationship between the legislative body, there are also 
problems in the context of institutional relations in the field of supervision of judges, 
especially the disharmony between the Supreme Court (MA) and the Judicial 
Commission (KY). There are two institutions which have the authority to supervise the 
judges, namely MA as an internal supervisor and KY as an external supervisor. This is 
where there is often a point of intersection between MA and KY which often leads to a 
                                                             
1  Indrayana, D. (2007). Amandemen UUD 1945: Antara Mitos dan Pembongkaran. Bandung: Mizan, p. 45-46. 
2  Ibid, p. 46. 
3  Mahfud, M.D. (2010). Perdebatan Hukum Tata Negara Pasca Amandemen Konstitusi.  Jakarta: RajaGrafindo 
Persada, p. 70.  
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disharmonious institutional relationship driven by the reluctance of MA to 
accommodate the recommendations of the KY in the context of supervision of judges 
which regarded by the MA as a form of intervention on the independence of judicial 
power. 
In contrast, KY finds that MA is less cooperative in implementing the recommendation 
given when the recommendation is very important in order to maintain the nobility, 
honor and dignity of the judges in the midst of the still widespread practice of judicial 
corruption in Indonesian judiciary. Unharmonious and yet synergistic relationship 
between MA and KY would be counterproductive in the effort to implement the judicial 
power reform because the energy that should be directed to improvement becomes 
drained by the constantly emerging conflict. For example, a judicial review to the 
Constitutional Court (MK) filed by MA judges in the Association of Indonesian Judges 
(IKAHI) who questioned the law that gives the authority of supervision and selection of 
judges to KY which later led to the cancellation of the law by MK. 
Third, the uncertainty of criteria related to which state institutions existence is directly 
regulated by the 1945 Constitution and which state institution regulated only by the law 
or with other regulations. This issue emerges when there are "conflicts" between state 
institutions related to the authority they have, such as between the Indonesian National 
Police (hereinafter, Polri) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the 
handling of corruption cases or between the Attorney General and the National Human 
Rights Commission (hereinafter, Komnas HAM) in handling cases of gross violations of 
human rights. 
Substantively, there is a mechanism of dispute settlement between state institutions 
regulated by the 1945 Constitution which gives authority to MK to resolve disputes of 
constitutional authority among state institutions whose existence and authority are 
directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution. However, problem emerges for institutions 
such as KPK, Attorney General and Komnas HAM which do not possess a legal standing 
in the constitutional authority disputes in MK because the three institutions are only 
regulated by the law, subsequently, when there is a dispute between these state 
institutions there is no legal mechanism to solve it. 
The existence of disputes between state institutions raises questions regarding the status 
of state institutions because some state institutions are regulated by the 1945 
Constitution and some are not. The question that emerged is, what is the criteria 
possessed by some state institutions to be directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution 
while other institutions are only regulated by the law. In terms of urgency, do state 
institutions directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution have more urgency than those 
that are not directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution? For example, viewed from the 
existence of state institutions that function and have authority in law enforcement, such 
as judicial institutions exercising judicial power, namely MK and MA whose existence 
is regulated under Article 24 paragraph (2)4 and Polri under the Article 30 paragraph 
(4)5, their existence are directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution. As for other law 
enforcement agencies, such as the Attorney General, its existence is not regulated 
directly by the 1945 Constitution. 
                                                             
4  Article 24 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution: “Judicial power shall be made by a Supreme Court and 
judicial bodies thereunder within a general judicature, religious court, military court, state administration court, 
and by a Constitutional Court.” 
5  Article 30 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution: “Indonesian National Police as the state’s instrument to 
maintain the public security and orderliness shall be assigned to protect, serve the public, and reinforce the law.” 
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Whereas the judiciary institutions (MA and MK), Polri and Attorney General are the 
institutions which are in charge of law enforcement whose field of duty is interrelated. 
This certainly raises the question, why the judiciary institutions (MA and MK) and Polri 
are regulated directly by the 1945 Constitution while the Attorney General is not? Are 
the judiciary institutions (MA and MK) and Polri much more important than the 
Attorney General so that the existence of both are regulated directly as a constitutional 
organ while the Attorney General is only regulated by law? The emergence of the 
problem is suspected due to the unclear criteria of the existence of state institutions based 
on the amendment of the 1945 Constitution so that it’s potentially causes institutional 
problems, such as authority disputes or overlapping tasks and functions between state 
institutions whose mechanism to settle are also unclear, especially for state institutions 
whose existence are not regulated by the 1945 Constitution. 
Fourth, in addition to the unclear criteria for institutional regulate of state institutions in 
the 1945 Constitution, such as the existence of the Attorney General, the same is true for 
the regulate of state institutions in the form of independent state commissions. Because 
there are state commissions that are directly regulated by the 1945 Constitution, such as 
the General Elections Commission (KPU) and KY, while KPK, Komnas HAM and a 
number of other state commissions are only regulated by law. The question is, do the 
duties and functions possessed by the KPU and KY are much more important than the 
KPK or Komnas HAM so that both are regulated directly by the 1945 Constitution? Yet 
if we look at the actual issues related to the rise of corruption and the practice of human 
rights violations, KPK and Komnas HAM should have urgency to be directly regulated 
by the 1945 Constitution, but in the reality,  they are not. This shows the unclear indicator 
of what is used to determine which state institution should directly regulated by the 1945 
Constitution and which institution is not regulated by the 1945 Constitution. 
Fifth, the amendment of the 1945 Constitution is based on one of its principles that is to 
strengthen the existence of presidential system which in its regulate still contains 
problem, especially regarding the legislation function related to institutional 
relationship with DPR. Viewed from the implementation of the Indonesian legislation 
function so far, the process of formulating a law involving the President and DPR in the 
discussion and to obtain mutual consent, this actually shows the implementation of 
legislation functions similar to the parliamentary system. Whereas generally, in the 
presidential system, the President is not involved or participate in the discussions and 
approvement of a bill discussed by parliament. However, the President has a veto to 
refuse to pass a bill from parliament which is a form of check and balances between the 
President and parliament. The law formation process in Indonesia based on the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution have parliamentary characteristic amid the 
application of presidential system. That is unusual and not in accordance with the effort 
to strengthen the presidential system in Indonesia. 
There are still a number of weaknesses in the context of institutional relationships 
between state institutions as described above, it is necessary for a comprehensive 
arrangement. Of course, the effort of the arrangement requires a re-amendment of the 
1945 Constitution. Therefore, the arrangement of state institutions through the fifth 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution is worth doing, because theoretically and 
empirically the changes to the Constitution is something that is reasonable if it is 
associated with the improvement of state administration. 
The study related to the institutional arrangement of the state is not new. However, in 
this paper, the authors focus on a more comprehensive institutional arrangement 
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through the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This arrangement has an urgency 
in order to establish an effective institutional relationship between the main power 
branches, such as executive, legislative and judiciary. In other side, this arrangement is 
also intended to strengthen the existence of a number of independent state commissions 
as branches of "new" powers that perform functions both in order to support existing 
state institutions or also to perform special functions. The author sees that only through 
the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution improvements to institutional relations 
and strengthening the authority among state institutions have a strong constitutional 
basis. Therefore, the arrangement of relations between state institutions are effort to 
realize the check and balances as a main purpose within the fifth amendment to the 1945 
Constitution. 
 
2. Urgency of Arrangement of Relationship between State Institutions in Indonesia 
The Constitution as a "social contract" is not a "sacred" document that cannot be changed 
so it is necessary to always be adapted to the various changes that exist in all sector of 
state life. The need for flexibility in the amendment of the Constitution to conform with 
constitutional development is an unavoidable necessity. The main reason to conduct the 
fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution has urgency in the framework of improvement 
and to make the 1945 Constitution as a living and working Constitution. 6  In the 
framework of the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution there are at least two reasons 
or urgency on why the 1945 Constitution needs to be amended: First, the fifth 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution is conducted in order to rectify the errors and 
weaknesses contained in the previous amendments, both in the process or substance; 
Second, the dynamics of state administration always moves and must be followed by 
the improvement of the Constitution so that it can be symmetrical with the ideals of the 
nation that has been agreed by the founding fathers.7 
Regarding the weakness contained in the 1945 amendment in terms of substance, one of 
the most prominent issues is the unclear arrangement of institutional relations in realize 
checks and balances among state institutions. Whereas the existence of state institutions 
is a fundamental element that becomes the substance of a Constitution, where the state 
institution is an organ that functions in the implementation of a state. The importance of 
the existence of state institutions, according Asshiddiqie, the substance of the 
Constitution essentially regulates the principles of regulation and limitation of state 
power in order to realize the national purpose, especially to regulate two interrelated 
relationships: First, the relationship between government with citizens; and second, the 
relationship between one government institution and another. Therefore, usually, the 
substance of the Constitution is meant to regulate three important matters, namely: (a) 
restricting the power of state institutions; (b) regulating relationship between state 
institutions with each other; and (c) regulating relationship between state institutions 
and citizens.8 
Thus, one of the important and constantly exist material in the Constitution is the 
regulate of state institutions. This is understandable because the power of the state is 
ultimately translated into the duties and authorities of state institutions. The 
                                                             
6  See: Naskah Akademis Usulan Amandemen Komprehensif, Kelompok DPD di MPR RI,  p. 1. 
7  Ibid.  
8  Asshiddiqie, J. (2008). Hubungan Antar Lembaga Negara Pasca Perubahan UUD 1945. Bahan ceramah pada 
Pendidikan dan Latihan Kepemimpinan (Diklatpim) Tingkat I Angkatan XVII Lembaga Administrasi 
Negara. Jakarta, 30 October 2008, p. 2. 
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achievement or failure of the state's goals ultimately leads to how the state institutions 
carry out their constitutional duties and authority as well as the relationships between 
state institutions. Because the arrangement of state institutions and relationships 
between state institutions reflects the choice of state fundamentals of which it’s adopt.9 
Because of the importance of the existence of state institutions, there is a need for proper 
arrangements within the framework of clear division of tasks, functions and authorities 
in order to avoid overlapping and there should be a mechanism of power balance (check 
and balances) in institutional relations so that state institutions can be effective and 
spared of abuse of power in carrying out their functions. 
Theoretically, the roots of the concept of check and balances cannot be separated from 
the classical theory of separation of powers from John Locke and Montesquieu by 
dividing the power of the state into three functions: the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. Meanwhile, based on the Black Law Dictionary, the definition of checks and 
balances is "arrangement of governmental power whereby the powers of one 
governmental branch check or balance those of other branches. See also separation of 
power ". Thus, checks and balances in the relationship between state institutions are 
creating constitutional relations to prevent abuse of power among branches of state 
power to establish a balance of relations in the practice of state administration. While the 
theory of separation of powers and power-sharing further illustrates the clarity of the 
position of every branch of state power in carrying out its constitutional functions, 
checks and balances emphasize more on the effort to build a balance mechanism for 
mutual control between branches of state power. However, checks and balances 
mechanisms can only be implemented as long as they have constitutional ground to 
prevent possible abuse by branches of state power.10 
The purpose of strengthening the checks and balances system in the implementation of 
power is to enable mutual control between branches of existing power and to avoid the 
conduct of hegemonic, tyrannical and centralized power. This system prevents the 
overlapping of existing authority. The existence of checks and balances system leads to 
a state power that can be regulated, restricted and even controlled as well as possible, so 
that abuse of power by the state apparatus that occupy positions in state institutions can 
be prevented and overcome as well as possible.11 
 
3.  Arrangement of Relationship Between State Institutions Through the Fifth 
Amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
In the spirit of the arrangement of relationships between state institutions in Indonesia 
through the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the main purpose is to improve 
the mechanism of checks and balances among state institutions that are considered to 
still contain many weaknesses after the four-time amendment of Constitution. Therefore, 
arrangement of relationships between state institutions in Indonesia through the fifth 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution should be based on the following principles:12 
a. The affirmation of the principle of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is an idea 
that requires the power of existing leaders and government bodies to be limited. 
                                                             
9  Ibid.  
10  Isra, S. (2010). Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi: Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer Dalam Sistem Presidensial 
di Indonesia. Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, p. 78.  
11  Rahmatullah, I. (2013). “Rejuvinasi Sistem Checks and Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan di 
Indonesia”, Jurnal Cita Hukum, 1 (2): 218-219. 
12  Huda, N. (2007). Lembaga Negara Dalam Masa Transisi Demokrasi. Yogyakarta: UII Press, p. 202-203.  
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Such restrictions may be strengthened into a fixed mechanism or procedure. 
Therefore, the purpose of the establishment of state institutions is to affirm and 
strengthen the principles of constitutionalism so that the basic rights of citizens are 
more secure and democracy can be maintained. 
b. The principle of checks and balances. There were number of abuse of power in the 
past, one of which is due to the lack of checks and balances mechanism in the state 
system, such as the supremacy of the MPR and the dominance power of the 
executive in the past practice have hampered the process of healthy democratic 
growth. The absence of a mechanism of mutual control between branches of power 
leads to a totalitarianized government and an increasing practice of abuse of power. 
The principle of checks and balances becomes the spirit for democratic development 
and progress. Therefore, the establishment of state institution must that leads to 
separation of power, to create checks and balances mechanisms. 
c. The principle of integration. Fundamentally, the concept of state institution 
formation must have a clear function and authority, it should also form a unity that 
proceed in implementing the functions of the state in the actual system of 
government. The establishment of a state institution can not be done partially, its 
existence must be linked with other institutions that already exist. The formation of 
state institutions should be structured in such a way that it becomes a unified and 
mutually reinforcing process. The lack of integrity in the formation of state 
institutions can result in overlapping of existing governmental authorities resulting 
in ineffectiveness of government administration. 
d. The principle of benefit for the community. The purpose of the establishment of the 
state institutions is, basically, to meet the welfare of its citizens and to guarantee the 
basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Both must be conducted for the public 
good as a whole and to protect the rights of individual citizens. 
Based on the principles of constitutionalism, the checks and balances, integration and 
benefit for the community, arrangement of relationship between state institutions in 
Indonesia will be directed as follow: 
First, the arrangement of the executive body. The context of this arrangement is directed 
to strengthening and purification of the presidential system. To purify the presidential 
system, the issue is primarily related to the authority involved in the law-making 
process, in which the President should no longer be involved in the process of formation 
of a bill. Thus, the mechanism of checks and balances in the discussion of the bill only 
occurs between DPR and DPD. So far, the legislative process in the formation of law in 
Indonesia tends to have the legislation character in a country that implements a 
parliamentary system where the government and parliament are involved together to 
discuss a bill. It happens because there is no clear separation between the legislative 
power and the executive power. The joint between the executive and the legislative 
branch is a characteristic that distinguishes the parliamentary system from other 
systems. With this involvement, the executive position become the member of the 
legislature as well. Consequently, in the discussion of a bill, there will also be 
involvement between the executive and the legislative. In a parliamentary system, the 
joint discussion of a bill between parliament and the government is a logical 
consequence of the there is no clear separation between the executive and the legislature. 
Even within the parliamentary system, executives (prime ministers, cabinets and 
bureaucracies) control the agenda of legislation13 
                                                             
13  Isra, S. (2010). Op.Cit, p. 326. 
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Indeed, during this time there is a contradiction in the government system in Indonesia, 
on the one hand, applied the presidential system but in legislation process tend to apply 
of parliamentary system. Therefore, in the strengthening and purification of the 
presidential system, there is a need to arrangement the legislation function in order to 
match the characteristics of the mechanism of its legislation function in the presidential 
system. Because in the presidential system, the president or the executive is not involved 
in the discussion of a bill, as stated by C.F. Strong, as a comparison, in the practice of the 
presidential system in the United States, the only relationship between the executive and 
the legislature is through the “President's Message” and none of the presidential cabinet 
officials are allowed to participate in any session of legislature chamber. Such 
relationship patterns means the government is not involved in the discussion of a bill in 
Congress or in one of the rooms (Senate and House of Representative) in the United 
States of America Congress.14 
The president (executive) participates after a bill is finalized and approved by the 
legislature. It proves that the function of legislation in the presidential system is a clear 
separation between the legislative power and the executive power. But in Indonesia 
mechanism of the formulation of law referred in the Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution 
after amendment, there is no separation of power between DPR and the President. What 
actually happens is the distribution of power and the reflection of the power in a law-
making process between DPR and President together.15 
As comparison, in the presidential system in United States of America, the president is 
not involved in the formation of a bill, but the president has a veto as a special right to 
reject the bill which has been approved by the legislature. However, the veto used by 
the president may be rejected with the support of a certain number of votes by the 
legislature. The president's veto that rejected by legislature is called overridden veto. In 
a presidential system, overridden veto and veto are part of the checks and balances 
mechanism between the president as executive and parliament as legislature. The 
importance of this veto in establishing checks and balances of institutional relations 
between the president and the legislature is also in order to protect the president as the 
executive power from the undermining of the legislature and the possibility of improper 
law.16 
In the framework of institutional relations arrangement in the effort to conduct 
purification of presidential system in Indonesia, the president should no longer 
participate in the discussion of a bill with the parliament and the President shall be 
granted a veto on the bill that submitted to him after discussed in each legislative room 
(DPR and DPD). With this pattern, the direction of purification of the implementation of 
presidential system, especially in the field of legislation in which a strict separation of 
powers between the executive and the legislature and the checks and balances between 
both are expected to be realized. 
Second, the arrangement of legislative body. The arrangement in this context is to clarify 
the position of MPR, DPD and DPR in their institutional relations as legislative bodies 
which directed to realize an effective bicameral system. However, with the fifth 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution, there was also an attempt to rebuild the MPR as 
the supreme body of the state, including to restore its authority in the establishment of 
GBHN as a blueprint of development in Indonesia. Of course the effort is deemed as a 
                                                             
14  Ibid, p. 326-327. 
15  Ibid, p. 328-329. 
16  Ibid, p. 329. 
P-ISSN: 2442-9880, E-ISSN: 2442-9899 
96 
 
step backward  which Indrayana termed as "romantic ideological myth".17 This perspective 
can blur the real issues that lie ahead as a challenge that must be answered immediately 
in an effort to build and strengthen the check and balances system, and not instead 
getting stuck with the mythical romance of the past about the institutional strength of 
MPR that was actually manipulatively used by Soeharto regime to maintain his power. 
The current representative system in Indonesia has not yet reflected a balanced 
institution between DPR and DPD so it has not been able to realize an effective bicameral 
system. In fact, based on Asshiddiqie's view, the parliamentary system in Indonesia is 
actually a “tricameral system”  because based on the provisions of Article 3 juncto Article 
8 paragraph (2) and (3) of the 1945 Constitution, the MPR has the authority to: (1) amend 
and to stipulate the Constitution; (2) discharge the President and / or Vice President 
during his / her term of office according to the Constitution; (3) elect the President and 
/ or Vice President to fill the vacancy in the position of President and / or Vice President 
according the Constitution; and (4) Inaugurates the President and / or Vice President. 
These four authorities are not covered and related to the authority of the DPR or DPD, 
so the MPR session to decide on these four matters is not at all a joint session between 
the DPR and DPD, but the MPR session as a separate institution. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that MPR is the third institution in the structure of the Indonesian parliament, 
so that the Indonesian parliament system is more suitable to be named as a three-room 
system (tricameral). Today, no country in the world has adopted a three-room system 
like this. Therefore, Indonesia can be considered to be the only country in the world to 
implement this three-room system.18  
This "tricameral" Indonesian parliament system means that the MPR is not only a joint 
session between DPR and DPD but an institution with its own institutional facilities, 
such as having leadership elements (Chairman and Vice Chairman of the MPR), 
secretariat and own organization structure. The existence of legislative bodies that 
established by the amendment of 1945 Constitution creates confusion due to the lack of 
clarity regarding of what kind of representative institution model is really desired. If the 
institutional model is directed to be bicameral with two representational models, namely 
the people's representation through a political party by DPR and a regional 
representative by DPD, it should have a balance of authority (checks and balances) 
between DPR and DPD. Whereas what happen in Indonesia is an imbalance in which 
the DPR is so superior in authority while the DPD is so weak. Meanwhile, MPR also has 
its own function and a complete institutional structure even though its regular authority 
is only once in every 5 years, namely to inaugurate the President and Vice President. 
Therefore, in the framework of arrangement representative institutions or legislative 
body in Indonesia which direction to realize the bicameral system should be carried out 
a number of steps as follows: 
a. Arrangement of MPR in the form of affirmation of MPR position as only become 
a joint session between DPR and DPD in the implementation of authority of MPR, 
such as to change and stipulate Constitution and some other authority. 
b. Arrangement of institutional relationship between DPR and DPD to realize the 
existence of checks and balances in the representative institution, it is necessary 
to strengthen the DPD's authority to balance with the authority of DPR. The 
                                                             
17  Indrayana, D. (2007). Amandemen UUD 1945: Antara...Op.Cit , p. 28. 
18  Asshiddiqie, J. (2007). Pokok-pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi. Jakarta : PT Bhuana Ilmu 
Populer, p. 159. 
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strengthening measures that can be done especially on the DPD are as follows: 
(1) strengthening the legislative function held by the DPD should be equivalent 
with DPR in proposing, discussing and approval a law. Especially related with 
bill  such as regional autonomy including the bill related to taxes, education, and 
religion; (2) the strengthening of the budget function for DPD in the discussion 
and approve of the state budget bill that equivalent with the DPR authority for 
the state budget that submitted by the president; (3) the strengthening of the 
supervisory function, the DPD should have the same authority with the DPR to 
have the right of interpellation, the right of enquette and the right of expression 
and to be involved if there is an impeachment process to the President and / or 
Vice President; (4) still in the context of the supervisory function, the DPD should 
be involved in the process of public official recruitment. The involvement DPD 
becomes a necessity because the recruitment of public official which only done 
by DPR is very likely to be bias based on the political interests of the party. That 
is, if the DPD is given sufficient space in the process of public official recruitment, 
political party interests in the DPR can be balanced by the DPD as a 
representation of regional interests.  
The arrangement of representative institutions or legislative body (MPR, DPD and DPR) 
is emphasize to realize strong bicameralism in strengthening the check and balances of 
institutional relations in Indonesia. There are several considerations for Indonesia to 
strengthen bicameral system, namely:19 
a. As Montesquieu puts it, a two-room system is a checks and balances mechanism 
between rooms in a legislative body. 
b. Simplification of representative system. There is only one central legislative body 
that consists of two elements, namely elements that directly represent all the 
people and elements that represent the region. There is no need for certain group 
representative. Group interests are represented through elements that directly 
represent the entire people. 
c. Regional representatives become part of the parliament functions (establishing 
laws, overseeing the government, establishing the state budget and others). Thus 
all regional interests are integrated and can be carried out day-to-day in 
parliament activities. This is one of the factors to strengthen unity, avoid 
disintegration. 
d. Two-room system will be more productive. All duties and authority can be done 
by each element. There is no need to wait or depend on one institution as the 
current DPR. 
Third, the arrangement of the judiciary. The arrangement of judicial institutions affirmed 
the concept of MK as “the court of law” and MA as “the court of justice”. MK should be 
given the authority to judicial review for all laws and regulations. While MA should no 
longer handling judicial review and only focuses on handling legal cases that are 
expected to bring about a sense of justice for every citizen. In addition, MA should also 
be given the authority of the previlegiatum forum, to decide cases of crime at the first and 
final level for state officials. In addition, the authority of MK also needs to be added to 
examine of constitutional complaint and no longer be authorized to decide the General 
Election Results Dispute (PHPU) specifically for the regional head election. So that MK 
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can focus in carrying out its main function in handling cases related to judicial review 
and constitutional complaint. 
In addition, which is also very important in the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
is related to the arrangement of institutional relationships between MA and KY in order 
to build institutional synergies in the supervision of judges. There is a need to develop 
the concept of share responsibility to build synergy between MA and KY in the context 
of judge management related to the recruitment of candidates for judges, training, 
mutation, promotion, supervision, dismissal and retirement of judges. The focus of the 
institutional relationship between KY and MA should be in order to synergize the 
internal control mechanism by MA with the external control mechanism by KY in order 
to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges. This arrangement by 
the concept of share responsibility between MA and KY becomes very important in 
strengthening the oversight mechanisms of judges and as an effort to realize the public 
accountability of the judiciary without disturbing the independence of judicial power. 
The implementation of share responsibility concept is expected to change the direction 
of judge management to be more professional and with integrity because there is the 
involvement of other institutions, namely KY as a function of checks and balances.20 
Fourth, arrangement of the Attorney General as constitutional organs. The position of 
the Attorney General in the through the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution, 
should be regulated directly by the Constitution. It is intended to make Attorney General 
possess constitutional authority and legal standing like other law enforcement agencies, 
namely Police and Courts (MA and MK). The strengthening of the existence of Attorney 
General in Indonesia to be regulated in the 1945 Constitution has a number of urgencies, 
namely:21 
a. To strengthen the existence of Attorney General whose existence is directly 
regulated by the 1945 Constitution in accordance with its duties and functions 
which are very urgent in the life of the state as a law enforcement agency. The 
existence of Attorney General in the 1945 Constitution will make clear its position 
as constitutional organ within the state structure which possess a constitutional 
authority, namely the authority given directly by the Constitution so that the 
Attorney General has a legal standing which if in the exercise of its authority there 
is a dispute of authority with other constitutional organs, the settlement may be 
submitted to MK as the institution authorized to decide the dispute over 
constitutional authority among state institutions. 
b. Strengthening the existence of Attorney General  as constitutional organ should 
become a momentum of arrangement of institutional relationship with other 
institutions, such as the relationship between Attorney General and Komnas HAM 
in the settlement of cases of gross violation of human rights. The potential disputes 
of authority between state institutions may occur with there are dualism of 
investigative and prosecution authority, as in the handling of corruption cases 
between  Attorney General, Polri and KPK. In the future, to be able to solve the 
problem of authority among state institutions, it is better to solve it through the 
dispute mechanism of authority in MK rather than to solve it politically. Of course, 
in the context of the fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution,  Attorney General 
                                                             
20  Hukumonline. (2017). Pentingnya Konsep Shared Responsibility dalam Rekrutmen Hakim. Available online 
from:  http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt58edde8768de5/pentingnya-konsep-shared-responsibility-
dalam-rekrutmen-hakim. (Accessed August 6, 2017). 
21  Patra, R. (2015). “Urgensi Kejaksaan Diatur Oleh Konstitusi”,  Hasanuddin Law Review, 1(3): 412-414.   
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shouldn’t be the only institution whose existence being strengthen by the 
Constitution but also a number of other institutions that have the same urgency to 
be constituted as constitutional organs, such as KPK and Komnas HAM. In the 
event of a dispute, these institutions have the legal standing for litigation in MK in 
a constitutional authority dispute. 
c. To strengthen the independence of Attorney General, its position should not be 
placed as a government institution that is merely a part of an executive, but to 
become an independent state institution which is reflected by the appointment and 
dismissal of the Attorney General not only by the President but also involves the 
role of parliament to give approval. This is a common practice in democratic 
countries, that the appointment of certain strategic positions, such as appointment 
Attorney General, requiring parliament involvement as a form of checks and 
balances between the executive and the legislature. 
d. To affirm that Attorney General as the central in the field of prosecution authority. 
In this context, it is necessary to arrange the existence of the prosecution authority 
possessed by KPK and the authority possessed by Attorney General. The existence 
of this dualism is certainly not ideal in building an effective institutional 
relationship so that the potential for conflict will continue to overshadow when a 
function or same affairs undertaken by two or more institutions. 
 
Fifth, the arrangement and institutionalization of independent state commissions as 
constitutional organs. Post-reform in Indonesia is marked by the rampant formation of 
a number of state institutions in the form of independent state commissions, such as 
Komnas HAM, KPU, KPK, KY and many more. Theoretically these institutions are 
named by various terms, namely quasi-state institutions, extra-structural institutions, 
independent and self-regulatory bodies, state auxiliary agencies, state auxiliaries 
institutions or supporting state institutions. Viewed from the legal basis of its formation, 
the existing state commissions in Indonesia have different legal basis of formation. Some 
are regulated by the 1945 Constitution, such as KY and KPU and some are regulated by 
law, such as Komnas HAM, KPK and others, and some even regulated by Presidential 
Decree, such as National Law Commission  (KHN). Considering the varied legal basis 
for the establishment of the state commissions, it raises the question as what is the 
standard of a state commission that regulated by the Constitution while others 
commission are only regulated by law or Presidential Decree? 
In terms of the duties and functions possessed by the independent state commissions, 
there is a similarity so there is vulnerability of overlapping with the tasks and functions 
of existing state institutions. For example, in the handling of corruption cases at least 
there are 3 institutions that have the authority, namely Attorney General, KPK and Polri. 
The handling of cases of gross violation of human rights involve the authority between 
Komnas HAM and Attorney General. While the supervision of judges involving the 
authority between KY and MA. The similarity of the duties of such functions has resulted 
in overlapping of authority that causing conflict among state institutions which of course 
is an unhealthy practice in relationship between state institution. 
Actually, after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution there is a mechanism for the 
settlement of authority disputes between state institutions through MK but it’s limited 
only to state institutions having constitutional authority, namely state institutions whose 
existence is regulated directly by the 1945 Constitution. As for the state institutions 
whose authorities regulated only by the laws or regulations under the 1945 Constitution, 
they have no legal standing for litigation in MK. It also affects state institutions in the 
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form of commission, because only KY and KPU are institutionally regulated directly by 
the 1945 Constitution, whereas the existence of other institutions, such as KPK and 
Komnas HAM only regulated by law so that they do not have the legal standing to 
litigate in MK. The implication is that when there is a conflict with other institutions 
related to dispute of authority, there is no legal mechanism that can be used as dispute 
resolution. Based on the problems of the existence of state commissions whose 
authorities are vulnerable to overlap each other, there is a need for the arrangement of 
the existence of these commissions. Therefore, arrangement effort through the fifth 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution should be comprehensive in that it includes 
institutions in the legislative, executive, judicative and include independent state 
commissions. All of these institutions need to be consolidated so that they do not 
develop without clear direction.22 
The fifth amendment of the 1945 Constitution should ideally be accompanied by the 
arrangement of duties, functions, positions and even the nomenclature of independent 
state commissions. Technically, the arrangements on independent state commissions 
may be regulated separately in a Chapter in the constitution about state commissions. 
The setting up of independent state commissions can contribute to strengthening a 
constitutional democratic government.23 
According to Indrayana, 24  the ambiguity of the position and overlap of authority 
possessed by the state commissions in Indonesia is due to the absence of a 
comprehensive concept about regulating of the state institutions, on what and how to 
regulate of the state commission should be. Finally, the state commission is only born as 
a reactive-responsive policy, but it is not precisely as a solution for the nationality issues. 
As instance of in the 1990s, South Africa and Thailand also transitioned from 
authoritarian governments and both countries experienced periods of established of 
state commissions. However, unlike Indonesia, South Africa and Thailand designed 
their state commissions in a more planned and comprehensive manner. The Constitution 
of South Africa sets out in detail the functions and duties of the state commission. 
Similarly in Thailand, the state commission has a place of honor in its constitution. 
Learning from South Africa and Thailand, the existence of Indonesia's state commissions 
should be strengthened. For example, as a form of commitment to eradicate corruption 
and human rights protection, KPK and Komnas HAM should be regulated to the 
Constitution. The existence of constitutional guarantees not only adds to the 
ammunition of life for both commissions, but also a strong signal to fight against 
corruption and human rights violations in Indonesia. On the other hand, it should also 
be accompanied by the maximization of supervision over the work of the commission. 
The arrangement the existing state commissions in Indonesia and the institutionalization 
of its existence into the Constitution through the fifth amendment of the 1945 
Constitution needs to be based on clear parameters or criteria, namely:25 
a. An independent state commission that has the urgency and function that 
strengthen the building of the rule of law, namely the state commission that 
encourages and maintains an independent and integrated system of justice, human 
                                                             
22  Huda, N. (2007). Op.Cit, p. 205. 
23  Sukmariningsih, R.M. (2014). “Penataan Lembaga Negara Mandiri Dalam Struktur Ketatanegaraan 
Indonesia”, Mimbar Hukum, 26 (2): 201. 
24  Indrayana, D. “Merevitalisasi Komisi di Negeri Kampung Maling” as cited in Huda, N. (2007). Op.Cit,  p. 
205-207. 
25  Indrayana, D. (2008). Negara Antara Ada dan Tiada: Reformasi Hukum Ketatanegaraan. Jakarta: Kompas, p. 
282-284.   
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rights protection, freedom of the press, corruption eradication and keeping fair 
general elections in Indonesia. 
b. An independent state commission that has the urgency to strengthen and realize 
checks and balances mechanisms in institutional relations. The existence of an 
independent commission is to strengthen the state administration, with a model 
relation of mutually balance and control among state institutions. Its existence not 
only as a support for other institution but also as a main state institution in terms 
of duties and functions. The independent state commissions that become to 
constitutional organs to complement KY and KPU are KPK, Komnas HAM, 
Ombudsman and the establishment of a new commission to provide protection 
and preserve freedom of the press, namely the Press Freedom Commission. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The fifth amendment needs to be done in order to improve the various weaknesses 
contained in the 1945 Constitution especially related to the arrangement of institutional 
relations such as problem of synergy and unclear status of state institutions, as well as 
overlapping duties, functions and authority. Therefore, it is necessary to arrange the 
state institutions with direction as follows: First, in the executive body, in order to 
strengthen the implementation and purification of presidential system; Second, the 
arrangement of legislative body, the purpose of arrangement is to realize a strong 
bicameralism system; Third, the arrangement of judicial institutions to affirmed the 
concept of MK as the court of law and MA as the court of justice; Fourth, the arrangement 
of institutional relationship between MA and KY in supervision of judge should be based 
on the concept of share responsibility; Fifth, making Attorney General as a constitutional 
organ and should be regulated directly by the Constitution; Sixth, the arrangement and 
institutionalization of independent state commissions as constitutional organs, based on 
clear criteria, namely: (a). independent state commission that has the urgency and 
function to strengthen the rule of law in Indonesia; (b) independent state commission 
that has the urgency to strengthen and realize checks and balances in relationship 
between state institutions. 
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